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Students receive abundant information about their educational performance, but how this information
affects future educational-investment decisions is not well understood. Increasingly common sources
of information are state-mandated standardized tests. On these tests, students receive a score and a
label that summarizes their performance. Using a regression-discontinuity design, we find persistent
effects of earning a more positive label on the college-going decisions of urban, low-income students.
Consistent with a Bayesian-updating model, these effects are concentrated among students with weaker
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The Impact of Test-Score Labels on Educational Outcomes 
 
  Standard economic models posit that students invest in further education if the expected 
marginal benefits of the investment exceed the expected marginal costs. Over time, as students 
accrue information about their educational performance, their perceptions of their abilities 
change. Because students’ abilities determine both the benefits and the costs of further education, 
these evolving perceptions may influence decisions about future educational investments. A 
simple model of Bayesian updating fits this dynamic well, as in each period students have prior 
beliefs about the value of future investments but update these beliefs as they obtain additional 
information about their performance.
1 Evidence suggests that students indeed use performance 
data to update their plans about continuing in school (Jacob & Wilder, forthcoming). 
  Educational investment decisions are important because educational attainments are 
strong predictors of subsequent labor-market earnings (Goldin & Katz, 2008). However, for 
individuals, these decisions can be complicated matters that involve processing—explicitly or 
implicitly—a great deal of information. Throughout their school careers, students receive regular 
performance data in the form of informal classroom feedback, grades on assignments, 
examination scores, and end-of-course grades. The advent of standards-based reform in 
American public education has increased dramatically the amount of available information, 
particularly about students’ mathematics and reading skills. 
  Recently, economists have paid a great deal of attention to the processes by which 
individuals make decisions when faced with an abundance of information. Theories of bounded 
rationality suggest that the cognitive (or time) cost of processing large amounts of information 
                                                 
1 Similarly, students may gain additional information about the expected returns to schooling or the cost of 
additional schooling; in this paper, we focus on information about students’ abilities and performances.  may exceed the benefit (e.g., Simon, 1957; Conlisk, 1996), leading individuals to use what 
Gigerenzer & Selten (2001) call “fast and frugal heuristics” in making decisions. Often times, 
these cognitive shortcuts enable people to make sufficiently good decisions by using only a 
fraction of the information available to them.  
In this paper, we examine how information that students receive about their academic 
performance affects their decisions to enroll in post-secondary education. In particular, we look 
at one specific piece of data – student performance on the state standardized mathematics test in 
grades 8 and 10 in Massachusetts. One key feature of such test-based accountability systems is 
that every student receives not only a test score but also a label based on their performance (for 
example, Failing, Needs Improvement, Proficient, or Advanced). The state assigns the labels by 
determining three cut-points with which it divides the finer-grained test-score distribution into 
four regions.  Given that understanding detailed test information can be a costly task, it makes 
sense to have a parsimonious summary that is easy for parents and students to interpret.   
One feature of these performance labels is that students who are essentially equally 
skilled, but whose scores on the examination fall just on opposite sides of a cut point, receive 
different labels. This would not matter if students made use of all available information in 
assessing their skills, and if their parents and teachers did so as well, because the label provides 
no information beyond the fine-grained score. However, because the label provides a powerful 
summary of student performance—perhaps one layered with substantial emotional content—
students (and their parents and teachers) may well respond to it rather than to the underlying test 
score. In this paper, we ask whether the label itself causes students to alter their decisions about 
pursuing post-secondary education. Importantly, we examine labeling on tests that carry no 
official, state-defined consequences for students. Most research examining the role of information in students’ educational decision-
making processes has relied on laboratory experiments or descriptive analyses. Here, we are able 
to draw causal conclusions about students’ responses based on the natural experiments that are 
created implicitly by the performance-labeling system that the state employs. We use a 
regression-discontinuity design to examine whether being assigned a more positive label affects 
future outcomes for students on the margin. Building on our past work, we focus on urban, low-
income students’ performances on the state mathematics examination.
2 We find that students do 
respond to these test-score labels and update their decisions about post-secondary education 
based on new information about their abilities. For example, being labeled Advanced rather than 
Proficient on the 10
th grade test increases by five percentage points the probability that urban, 
low-income students at the margin will attend college.  Interestingly, these responses are much 
greater for students on the margin of earning extreme labels (i.e., Warning or Advanced) than for 
more moderate labels (i.e., Needs Improvement or Proficient).  
In a Bayesian-updating model, such responses should be strongest among students who 
have weak prior beliefs about their abilities. We look for these heterogeneous responses by 
focusing on students who report before they take the test that they do not plan to attend a four-
year college. Indeed, we find much greater responses for students in this group. For example, 
being classified as Advanced rather than Proficient on the 10
th grade mathematics test increases 
by ten percentage points the probability that they will enroll in college.  
These results suggest that updating does occur and that seemingly small interventions like 
test-score performance labels can have substantial effects, particularly for some students. As 
theory would predict, these effects are concentrated among students with weaker prior beliefs 
                                                 
2 In an analysis of students’ behavioral responses to failing a high-stakes exit examination, we found that effects 
were concentrated among urban, low-income students on the mathematics examination (Papay, Murnane, & Willett, 
2010).  about their academic abilities. These results provide strong evidence that students (or their 
teachers) are not using the full range of performance information available to them but that the 
labels themselves induce important behavioral responses. Using these labels as summaries may 
work well for some students, but it has important consequences for students near the cut-offs. 
This paper raises important implications not only for policymakers designing test-based 
accountability systems but also for researchers using the regression-discontinuity design. In 
recent years, economists have exploited test-based cutoffs that assign students to different 
treatments in order to draw causal conclusions about these treatments. To the extent that students 
respond to any associated performance labels, assignment to treatment may be confounded with 
an effect of labeling, producing biased estimates of treatment effects. 
  In the next section, we review briefly the ways in which performance labels may 
influence students’ subsequent educational decisions. We then describe our data sources, key 
measures, and data-analytic strategy. We present our main findings and describe sensitivity 
analyses that we conduct to assess the robustness of our results. Finally, we conclude with a 
discussion of our findings, and their implications for educational practice in a regime of test-
based accountability and for research using the regression-discontinuity design.  
Background and Context 
Responses to abundant information  
  In many contexts, individuals have access to abundant information that can inform 
decision-making. Many traditional economic models assume agents take into account all 
available information in making their decisions. However, influenced by the work of Herbert 
Simon (1957), economists have introduced models of bounded rationality that include the costs 
associated with information processing.  In these models, agents may rely on heuristics – rules of thumb or cognitive short-cuts – to make decisions (Conlisk, 1996). Economists and 
psychologists have also examined the role of emotional responses and self-image in economic 
decisions (e.g., Kaufman, 1999; Loewenstein, 2000; Ackerlof & Kranton, 2002). Muramatsu & 
Hanoch (2005) argue that emotions “play a central role in guiding and regulating choice 
behavior, by virtue of their capacity to modulate numerous cognitive and physiological 
activities” (p. 202). Emotional responses can affect how individuals use information and thus can 
influence decision-making processes. This may be particularly true for adolescents, who are 
making important decisions about investing in further schooling during a period in which their 
cognitive development is not yet complete and levels of hormones that affect emotions are 
changing rapidly (Nelson & Sheridan, forthcoming).  
Educational performance and updating 
  Many economic models posit that the benefits and costs of investing in additional 
education depend on an individual’s abilities.
3 Individuals who believe they have stronger 
academic abilities may invest more heavily in education. From a Bayesian perspective, the extent 
to which an individual updates perceptions of his abilities when presented with new information 
depends on the strength of his prior beliefs, the importance of the new information, and the 
extent to which the new information is consistent with prior beliefs.
4  
                                                 
3 For example, in both human capital and signaling models, student ability is an important factor in educational 
investment decisions. 
4 Performance labels might also affect students’ decisions about education by influencing behaviors of parents and 
teachers.   Both parents and teachers may reward or encourage students who score well. For example, a teacher may 
look through the list of students who pass the test and may see certain students in a new light because of their 
successes. There is a long literature in education that teachers’ expectations of student performance affect student 
outcomes (e.g., Jussim & Harber, 2005). In fact, President Bush argued that the No Child Left Behind Act was 
necessary in part because it challenged the “soft bigotry of low expectations” for disadvantaged and minority 
students. Furthermore, these indirect effects can take many forms and can be either reinforcing or compensatory. In 
other words, parents may reinforce the positive effect of earning a better label by talking to the student about 
college, or they may compensate for the negative effect of earning a worse label by providing the student with 
additional tutoring or supports. Obviously, these responses operate in different directions, and we cannot disentangle 
them here. A number of scholars have hypothesized that adolescents’ beliefs about their academic 
abilities may be particularly susceptible to new information, and that perceptions of ability 
therefore must influence adolescents’ educational decisions. Starting with Brookover, Thomas, 
and Paterson (1964), sociologists and psychologists have marshaled substantial evidence that 
students’ self-judgments about their potential for academic success can affect educational 
outcomes (e.g., Crocker et al., 2003; Shen & Pedulla, 2000). Claude Steele and Joshua 
Aronson’s work on stereotype threat suggests that external factors can affect individuals’ 
performances on cognitive tasks. Aronson & Steele (2005) write: “although clearly not the most 
fragile thing in nature, competence is much more fragile – and malleable – than we tend to think” 
(p. 436). Specifically, they continue, intellectual competence “is quite literally the product of real 
or imagined interactions with others. How a student construes the way he or she is viewed and 
treated by others matters a lot” (p. 437).  
These psychological studies largely rely on experimental manipulations in a laboratory 
setting. However, several recent observational studies provide descriptive evidence that students 
do update their expectations about how much education they will complete when they receive 
new information about their academic performances (Jacob & Wilder, forthcoming; 
Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2009).
5 This may provide part of the explanation why a 
substantial percentage of students who report that they plan to attend college fail to do so (Jacob 
& Wilder, forthcoming).    
We might expect substantial heterogeneity across students in how malleable their 
judgments of their abilities are (i.e., in the strength of their priors). As Rabin and Schrag (1999) 
                                                 
5 While the sociological literature distinguishes between “educational aspirations” and “educational expectations,” 
Jacob and Wilder (forthcoming) show that the responses to survey questions aimed at capturing the two concepts are 
extremely highly correlated.  For that reason, we do not distinguish between these concepts and use “expectations” 
or “plans” throughout the paper. assert, “if we posit a cost to information processing, in many settings the natural stopping rule 
would be to process information until beliefs are sufficiently strong in one direction or another, 
and then stop” (p. 41). Thus, students with strong priors about their abilities may be quite 
insensitive to new information, while students whose beliefs are less fully developed may be 
more sensitive. In other words, students whose self-identities and beliefs about their abilities are 
strongly formed may not change these beliefs except in the face of abundant evidence to the 
contrary. In contrast, students who lack confidence might be much more willing to update their 
beliefs.   
The amount of updating also depends on how important students perceive the new 
information to be. For example, an “A” on a small homework assignment may not influence a 
student’s ideas about her abilities as much as an “A” on a final course examination. Given that 
teachers, school administrators, and even state officials emphasize the importance of scores on 
state standardized tests (often because the scores have consequences for educators), students may 
see them as meaningful measures of their proficiency.  
  Understanding the role of performance data in influencing students’ decisions about 
whether to invest in post-secondary education is important for two related reasons.  First, the 
college wage premium is substantial and has grown over the past few decades (Goldin & Katz, 
2008). Consequently, it makes sense for public policies to support college enrollment for all 
students with the capacity to succeed in post-secondary education.  Second, college access has 
become a centerpiece of educational policy discussions, in part because the growth in college 
enrollment rates has slowed in recent years. For example, both the U.S. Department of Education 
and the Gates Foundation have focused substantial attention – and resources – on college 
readiness and access.  Standards-based reform and state testing 
Over the past few decades, most states, including Massachusetts, have implemented test-
based accountability programs to monitor student progress toward mastering content standards. 
In 2001, as part of No Child Left Behind (the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA)), the federal government required that all states taking federal ESEA funds 
adopt academic standards, develop an annual testing program to assess student progress toward 
those standards, and define what proficient mastery of those standards meant.
6 Currently, states 
must test all students in both mathematics and English language arts (ELA) in grades 3 through 
8, and on a single occasion in high school.  
The NCLB legislation set the goal that all American public-school students should be 
proficient in mathematics and ELA by 2014. It also mandated that all schools must demonstrate 
annually that they are making “Adequate Yearly Progress” (AYP) toward this goal for students 
in a variety of demographic subgroups, including racial minorities and students with special 
educational needs or limited English proficiency. Schools that fail to meet AYP for several years 
in a row are subject to increasingly severe sanctions.  
Although the testing policies under NCLB did not mandate any consequences for 
students who failed to demonstrate mastery of state content standards, some states have 
implemented “high-stakes” testing for students, particularly in high school. Currently, 26 states, 
serving nearly three-quarters of the nation’s children, have or are phasing in exit examinations, 
typically in ELA and mathematics, that high school students must pass in order to graduate 
(Center on Education Policy, 2008). In earlier work, we and others have examined the effects of 
barely failing these exit examinations (Papay, Murnane, & Willett, 2010). Students who fail an 
                                                 
6 Allowing states to define their own standards, create their own tests, and set their own proficiency levels has 
produced substantial variation across states in the level of student achievement defined as “proficient.” exit examination must retake and pass it in order to graduate from high school. As a result, 
failure has tangible consequences for students.  
Research Questions 
In this paper, we focus on performance labels that do not carry official consequences for 
students. We examine how students respond to a specific piece of information about their 
performance – the label that they earn on the Massachusetts standardized mathematics 
examination. Using a regression-discontinuity design, we examine the impact of the labeling by 
comparing the college-planning and college-enrollment decisions of students who were assigned 
exogenously to different labels because they scored close to, but fell on different sides of, the 
state-mandated labeling cut-points. 
We focus our analysis on low-income students attending urban schools. We do so 
because, in earlier work, we found that failing one of the 10
th grade exit examinations reduced 
the probability of high school graduation for low-income urban students, but it did not do so for 
their suburban or wealthier peers (Papay, Murnane, & Willett, 2010). In Massachusetts, 
wealthier students and suburban students have several advantages over urban, low-income 
students, on average. Their families often have better access to outside academic supports. 
Furthermore, their schools, which tend to serve lower concentrations of students with limited 
English proficiency, special educational needs, and from impoverished backgrounds, are able to 
concentrate more resources on individual struggling students than urban schools with many such 
students can. In this paper, we examine the effects of labeling on very different tests – those that 
do not carry official consequences for students – but we retain our focus on this traditionally 
disadvantaged group.  Similarly, we focus on testing in mathematics because our past work 
found that, for urban, low-income students on the margin of passing, barely passing the mathematics high-school exit examination increased the probability of graduation substantially, 
but there were no effects of barely passing the ELA examination (Papay, Murnane, & Willett, 
2010).   
To examine whether performance labels affect educational outcomes more for some 
students than for others, we make use of students’ responses to survey questions about their 
educational plans that were asked before the students were administered the state examinations. 
The research community has long known that student plans predict educational attainment, even 
after controlling for educational performance and other background characteristics (Duncan, 
Featherman, & Duncan, 1972; Sewell, Haller, & Ohlendorf, 1970; Sewell, Haller, & Portes, 
1969). However, the development of educational expectations is a process that researchers do not 
understand well (Jacob & Wilder, forthcoming). We examine whether the effects of labeling 
depend on students’ initial post-secondary educational plans, and whether the performance label 
students receive causes them to update these plans.  
Importantly, we have framed the discussion in terms of students’ responses to receiving a 
beneficial performance label – a result of obtaining a score just above a cut-point.  However, 
students could also respond negatively to receiving a negative performance label – a result of 
obtaining a score just below a cut-point. We cannot distinguish the effect of encouragement from 
that of discouragement unambiguously with our regression-discontinuity strategy. However, we 
use students’ test-score histories to provide some insight into which groups appear to experience 
encouragement effects and which appear to experience discouragement effects.    
To summarize, our specific research questions are: 
1:  Does the performance label information that urban, low-income students receive on 
the Massachusetts state mathematics test affect their college enrollment decisions?  2: Are the post-secondary plans and college enrollment decisions of students who did not 
plan initially to attend a four-year college more sensitive to new performance 
information than the decisions of students with college-going plans?  
3: Does prior test performance shed light on the relative importance of encouragement 
and discouragement effects?   
Research Design 
Data Sources 
Our data come from Massachusetts, a state that has placed a high priority on educational 
reform. Since the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993, which introduced standards-
based reforms and state-based testing, Massachusetts has invested substantially in K-12 public 
education. Under these reforms, the state began administering the Massachusetts Comprehensive 
Assessment System (MCAS) mathematics and English language arts (ELA) examinations in 
1998.  For most students, performance on these tests carries no official consequences. However, 
starting with the class of 2003, the 10
th grade tests became high-stakes exit examinations that 
students must pass in order to graduate from high school.
7  
To address our research questions, we have integrated several datasets provided by the 
Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. The first comes from the 
state’s longitudinal data system, which tracks students throughout their school careers (K-12) 
and includes unique student identifiers, MCAS test results, demographic characteristics, school 
and district identifiers, and responses to surveys that students complete just before taking the 
MCAS examinations.  We have supplemented this dataset with records from the National 
                                                 
7 Starting with the class of 2010, the state also included science examinations as part of the exit examination 
requirement. This requirement did not apply to students in our sample.  Student Clearinghouse that tracks students’ post-secondary educational attainments.  
We focus on examinations and performance labels that have no official, state-determined 
consequences for students; in other words, they are “low stakes” from the perspective of the 
student. In 8
th grade, the examination is used simply to hold schools and districts accountable. 
However, the 10
th grade examination is a high-stakes exit examination. As a result, in 10
th grade 
we focus on students whose scores fall well above the passing cutoff. Specifically, we examine 
the effects of labeling at three different cutoffs:  at Needs Improvement vs. Warning on the 8
th 
grade test, at Proficient vs. Needs Improvement on the 8
th and 10
th grade tests, and at Advanced 
vs. Proficient on the 8
th and 10
th grade tests. The state does not treat students on either side of 
these cutoffs differently and this information is not provided to colleges.
8 
We pool data across several years, examining students who took the 8
th or 10
th grade 
mathematics examinations in the spring of 2003 through 2007. These students are members of 
the graduating cohorts of 2005 through 2011. For each year, we restrict our sample to students 
who took the MCAS examination for the first time in that grade, excluding any students who had 
repeated the grade and were taking the test for a second time.  
Measures 
To address our research questions, we created several outcome variables. Our main 
outcome (COLLi) measures whether students attended college by June 1, within one year after 
their intended cohort’s high-school graduation date.
9  We created an additional outcome by 
                                                 
8 Importantly, for some students, earning Advanced instead of Proficient in grade 10 makes them eligible for a state-
sponsored Adams Scholarship to support post-secondary education, and is therefore a cutoff that carries 
consequences for students. As we explain below, we focus our attention on a sample of students for whom this is not 
the case.  
9 We focus on enrollments after the student (or their cohort) graduated from high school in order to avoid mistakenly 
counting students who take college courses during high school as college enrollees. We define on-time cohort 
graduation as occurring four years after the student took the 8
th grade examination and two years after the student 
took the 10
th grade examination. recoding responses about their post-secondary educational plans that students provide 
immediately before they take the MCAS examinations. The survey question to which they 
responded reads as follows:
10 
Which of the following best describes your current plans for what you will do after you 
finish high school? 
    A. I plan to attend a four-year college. 
  B. I plan to attend a community college, business school, or technical school. 
    C. I plan to work full-time after graduating from high school. 
    D. I plan to join the military after graduating from high school. 
    E. I have other plans. 
    F. I have no plans right now. 
 
The state has asked this question of all 10
th graders since the 2002-03 school year and of all 8
th 
graders starting in 2005-06. 76% percent of Massachusetts low-income urban 10
th grade students 
(and 85% of 8
th graders) completed this survey. We focus on four-year college plans and code a 
dichotomous outcome (COLL_PLANi) to indicate whether the student reported that he or she 
planned to attend a four-year college after high school or not.
11   
Our key predictors come from the state-testing dataset, which includes a record of scores 
from every MCAS examination that each student took from 3
rd grade through high-school 
graduation. The state reports test information at four levels: as item-level responses, raw scores, 
scaled scores, and performance levels. The scaled scores range from 200 to 280 in increments of 
two points. A score of 220 qualifies as passing, with a different performance rating each 20 
points, as follows:  
                                                 
10 Although the state has made minor changes to the question over the years, all versions are quite similar to the one 
presented here from the 2005 administration. 
11 Note that we focus on four-year college plans here, but we define our measure of college attendance to include 
any student who entered a two-year or a four-year college. We make this distinction for several reasons. First, given 
that nearly all students in the state plan to attend some college, defining a demographic subgroup based on this 
distinction would not be particularly meaningful. Furthermore, expressing four-year college-going plans is actually a 
stronger predictor of college attendance (at either a two-year or four-year college) than plans to attend any college. 
Third, and more importantly, some students who enter a two-year college eventually matriculate to a four-year 
college. Unfortunately, for most students we cannot track their progress through post-secondary education long 
enough to observe this pattern, so we instead count students as attending college if they enter either a two-year or 
four-year college initially. (a) 200 to 218: Failing/Warning 
(b) 220 to 238: Needs Improvement 
(c) 240 to 258: Proficient 
(d) 260 to 280: Advanced  
 
Because the scaled scores have such a coarse scale, with multiple raw scores mapping on to a 
single scaled score, we use raw scores in our analyses.
12 
  Students receive information about their test performance in detailed reports several 
months after taking the test.  In Appendix A, we include an example of one such report; notice 
that it provides students with information about their test score, a confidence interval around the 
score, and a performance label. It also contains interpretive information (not shown) to help 
students and parents make sense of their test scores. Thus, students and parents receive a 
substantial amount of information about their test performance in addition to the score and label. 
Although the label adds no additional information to the test score, it remains the easiest and 
most intuitive element of the report to interpret.  
To implement our regression-discontinuity approach, we center students’ raw scores by 
subtracting out the value of the corresponding minimum passing score associated with the 
relevant cut-point. On the re-centered continuous predictor (MATHi), which serves as our 
“forcing variable” in the regression-discontinuity analyses, a student with a score of zero had 
achieved the minimum passing score at that cut-point. We also created a dichotomous version of 
this same predictor (ABOVEi=1{MATHi≥0}).
13 To address our third research question, we 
include lagged versions of this last predictor (PAST_ABOVEi) to indicate whether the student fell 
above or below the relevant cut score on the previous test they took (e.g., grade 8 for the grade 
                                                 
12 Although multiple raw scores map to the same scaled score, each raw score corresponds to only one scaled score 
in a given year. For example, in 2004, all students earning 23, 24, 25, or 26 points received a 220. The state derives 
its scaled scores by using a piecewise non-linear transformation that leads to clumping of students near the scaled 
score thresholds. As we illustrate below, there are no such issues with the raw scores. For more information on 
MCAS scoring and scaling, see the MCAS Technical Reports (MA DOE, 2002, 2005). 
13 In this presentation, we use the word “Above” to indicate students who earned the more positive label and 
“Below” to indicate students who earned the less positive label. 10 analyses). 
Sample 
As stated above, we focus our analyses on students who are eligible for federal free or 
reduced price lunch programs and who are enrolled in one of Massachusetts’s 22 urban school 
districts.
14 This group constitutes 13% percent of Massachusetts 10
th grade students who take the 
examination (and 18% of 8
th graders). The extent to which we can examine each of our outcomes 
for specific cohorts depends on the timing of the initial test and outcome data collection. In other 
words, we must have five years of data after the 8
th grade test to examine the effect of 
classification on college outcomes, but only two years to examine the effects on college-going 
plans expressed in 10
th grade. As seen in Table 1, each of our analyses uses a different number of 
years of data. Importantly, since survey responses of 8
th graders to the question about post-
secondary educational plans are only available beginning with the 2005-06 cohort, we use data 
from only two cohorts for the analyses that examine whether the effects of eighth grade 
performance labels depend on students’ initial college-going plans (our second research 
question) and we cannot examine actual college-going outcomes for this group.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In several of our analyses, we examine heterogeneity based on the post-secondary 
educational plans that students report before they take the 8
th and 10
th grade examinations. 
Among urban, low-income students, 63% of those who completed the 10
th grade survey, and 
57% of those who completed the 8
th grade survey, reported that they planned to attend a four-
year college. In Table 2, we describe our sample in more detail. In the first two columns, we 
present the number of urban, low-income students in each test-performance category, along with 
the number who responded to the survey question concerning post-secondary educational plans. 
                                                 
14 The state defines urban districts as those that participate in the state’s Urban Superintendents Network. Note that these figures do not correspond to response rates for 8
th graders because the survey 
questions were not asked every year.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
  In the third column, we present the sample percentage of urban, low-income students 
who reported planning to attend a four-year college, by performance level. Clearly, there is a 
strong performance gradient in college-going plans: students with better scores have a much 
greater probability of planning to attend a four-year college than their lower-performing peers. 
For example, 85% of low-income urban 10
th graders who score Advanced plan to attend a four-
year college, compared to just 46% of those who score Failing. However, that nearly half of 
students in the Failing category plan to attend a four-year college suggests that it is a popular 
option even for low-performing students.  
Importantly, planning to attend a four-year college is not simply a catch-all for a specific 
demographic group. In fact, among urban, low-income students, white males are the least likely 
to express plans to attend a four-year college. In Figure 1, we display the sample probability that 
low-income urban 10
th grade students express plans to attend a four-year college, by race and 
gender. Asian students have the highest probability of expressing four-year college plans, 
followed closely by African-American students. Hispanic students express slightly higher 
probabilities than whites. Across all racial/ethnic groups, the sample probability that a girl plans 
to attend college is greater than for boys. Importantly, we find very similar patterns when we 
condition on student test scores, so these results do not simply reflect the effect of differential 
performance across demographic groups (results available from authors on request).  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Data Analyses To examine the causal effect of performance labeling on post-secondary educational 
attainments, we use a regression-discontinuity strategy. By examining students immediately on 
either side of each cut score, on the forcing variable, we compare the population probability of 
attending college for two groups of students – those who scored at the cut score and earned the 
more positive label (represented by parameter  above  ) and those (hypothetical) students who 
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If the cut score were established exogenously, then students just on either side of the cut score 
must be equal in expectation prior to labeling and the estimated difference between these 
parameters provides an unbiased estimate of the causal impact of the classification for students at 
the cut score, in the population (Lee & Lemieux, 2010; Murnane & Willett, 2011; Shadish, 
Cook, & Campbell, 2004). Because the labels are applied rigidly such that all students who score 
below the cut-off on the forcing variable are assigned one label and all students who score above 
the cut-off are assigned a different – and more positive – label, our discontinuity is sharp.  
In this presentation of the analytic method, we focus on the college-attendance outcome, 
but we use the same analytic strategy to conduct analyses of our post-secondary plan outcome. In 
its basic formulation, this approach involves fitting a linear probability model of the following 
form:  
   i i i i i i MATH ABOVE ABOVE MATH COLL p             3 2 1 0 1       (1) 
for the i
th student. In this model, β2 represents the causal effect of interest. If its estimated value 
is statistically significant and positive, then we can conclude that classifying a student at the cut 
score as earning the more positive label, as opposed to earning the less positive label, causes the student’s probability of attending college to increase discontinuously, on average, in the 
population.  
The internal validity of our regression-discontinuity analyses – and consequently our 
ability to make the required unbiased causal inferences – rests on two key assumptions. First, 
students must not be able to manipulate their position on the forcing variable knowingly relative 
to the cut score. Given the complicated scaling procedures used to determine the cut-offs, we 
have strong reason to believe that this assumption holds. Second, we assume that we can model 
credibly the underlying relationship between the probability of attending college and the forcing 
variable, student MCAS score. Because our parameters of interest –  above   and  below   – represent 
limits projected on to the discontinuity, from left and right, we estimate them using the 
nonparametric smoothing method of local linear regression implemented within an explicitly 
defined bandwidth on either side of the discontinuity, as recommended by Hahn, Todd, & Van 
der Klaauw (2001).
15  
Our implementation of this strategy follows the approach laid out by Imbens and 
Lemieux (2008).  To determine the amount of smoothing imposed during the local linear-
regression analysis, we estimate an optimal value for the bandwidth (h
*) using a well-defined 
statistical fit criterion and a cross-validation procedure described by Imbens & Lemieux 
(2008).
16 We estimate h* separately for each analysis, and report these optimal bandwidths in our 
tables. To produce our figures, we fit local linear-regression trends using this bandwidth across 
the entire range of our data. However, our causal inferences derive only from estimates of 
                                                 
15 Fan (1992) shows that, unlike most nonparametric smoothing techniques, local linear regression does not require 
boundary modifications. 
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  min , where  ) ( ˆ h LL O C i is the predicted value using a bandwidth of h. In some cases, 
this function does not reach a clear global minimum over the range of plausible bandwidths; in these cases, we use 
the local minimum that produces the smallest bandwidth, sacrificing statistical power in an effort to reduce bias. projections onto the outcome axis at the cut score. As a result, we can estimate the parameter of 
principal interest in our analyses, the difference between above   and  below  , in one step by fitting 
the single local linear-regression model presented in equation (1) using observations that fall 
only within one bandwidth (h
*) on either side of the relevant cut score.
17  
In our analyses, we extend this basic analytic approach in several ways. First, to improve 
the precision of our estimation, we add to the model in (1) a vector of covariates describing 
selected aspects of the student background, including dichotomous predictors that describe 
student race, gender, and whether the student was new to the state, was currently or formerly 
classified as limited English proficient, or required special education. We also include the fixed 
effect of cohort to account for average differences in our outcome across years.
18 We present our 
main results from models that control for these background characteristics. However, we find it 
reassuring that the results from uncontrolled models are quite similar.  
To address our second research question, we fit a statistical model similar to that 
specified in (1), using a similar local linear-regression approach. In this case, though, we include 
the student’s pre-treatment self-reported college plans (COLL_PLANi)  as a covariate and 
interact it with the main predictors, as follows:  
         i i i i i MATH ABOVE ABOVE MATH COLL p 3 2 1 0 1          
       ) _ ( ) _ ( 5 4 i i i i PLAN COLL ABOVE PLAN COLL MATH         (2) 
 i i i i i PLAN COLL PLAN COLL MATH ABOVE         _ _ 7 6  
for the i
th individual. Again, we obtain estimates of causal effects by fitting the model to 
observations that fall within one bandwidth on either side of the relevant cut score, on the forcing 
                                                 
17 In all cases, we adjust our standard errors to account for the discrete nature of our assignment variable by 
clustering observations, as recommended by Lee and Card (2008). We cluster observations at each score point. 
18 We tested whether adding school fixed effects would increase the explanatory power of our models, and found 
that they did not. We also found that the critical estimated parameters were not sensitive to the decision of whether 
to include school fixed effects in the corresponding model. Results are available from the authors on request. variable. In this model, parameter  2   represents the causal effect of receiving the more positive 
performance label on the population probability of attending college for students at the margin 
who did not plan to attend a four-year college. The linear combination of parameters,  5 2    , 
represents the same effect for students who did plan to attend a four-year college. For these 
analyses, we necessarily restrict our sample to low-income urban students who completed the 
survey. We also follow this same analytic approach to address our third research question by 
including an indicator of the student’s past test performance (PAST_ABOVEi) as a covariate in 
the model and interacting it with predictors of interest.  
Importantly, one key limitation of all analyses using a regression-discontinuity approach 
is that the results pertain only to students with scores close to the cut-points on the forcing 
variable.  However, one strength of our study is that we can look for labeling effects at different 
cut-points and for students in both grade 8 and grade 10. We find relatively similar patterns at 
each grade level, although we do see evidence that some labels matter more than others and that 
different margins may be at play at different points in the test-score distribution. Again, we focus 
all of our analyses on tests that carry no official consequences for Massachusetts students.
19 
Findings 
(1) Does the performance label affect post-secondary enrollment decisions?  
                                                 
19 The state has a college scholarship program (called the Adams Scholarship) that provides post-secondary support 
for students with high 10
th grade MCAS scores. To be eligible, students must earn Advanced in either mathematics 
or ELA, at least Proficient in the other subject, and be in the top 25% of all test-takers in their district in terms of 
total score. To avoid any potential confounding of the effects of scholarship receipt and performance labeling, we 
focus our attention in 10
th grade on the sample of students for whom scoring Advanced instead of Proficient in 
mathematics does not affect their scholarship eligibility. We do this in two ways. First, we exclude from our sample 
any student who scored Proficient on the ELA examination. Second, we exclude only students who scored 
Proficient on the ELA test and who scored in the top 25% of their district. Both samples give us quite similar results, 
so we present our findings using the less restrictive, second sample. Results from the first sample are available from 
the authors on request.   We find that earning a more positive performance label causes urban, low-income 
students to attend college at greater rates, at least at certain performance levels. The effects are 
small, but important substantively. In Table 3, we present the estimated causal effects of earning 
a more positive performance label on college enrollment, at each of the cut scores. Being 
classified as Needs Improvement as opposed to Warning in 8
th grade increases the fitted 
probability of enrolling in college by 2.1 percentage points (p=0.056).  Since only 38% percent 
of urban, low income 8
th graders scoring near the cutoff enroll in college within one year of 
cohort graduation, a 2.1 percentage point difference represents a substantial effect.  
We find no effect of earning Proficient instead of Needs Improvement in either grade. 
Interestingly, this is the cutoff that is used to define Adequate Yearly Progress under No Child 
Left Behind. Students near this cut score may be subject to strategic behaviors, and the focus on 
these “bubble kids” on either side of the cutoff may produce these dampened effects (Booher-
Jennings, 2005; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010). Alternately, more moderate labels like Proficient 
and Needs Improvement may not be as meaningful to students.  
We find that receiving the Advanced rather than the Proficient label on the 10
th grade 
mathematics test increases the probability that urban low-income students enroll in college by 
5.1 percentage points (p=0.024). Again, this is a large impact, considering that fewer than 60% 
of the urban, low-income students scoring near the cutoff enroll in college. In contrast, receiving 
Advanced rather than the Proficient label on the 8
th grade mathematics test has no impact on the 
probability of college enrollment.  One possible explanation for the difference between the 8
th 
and 10
th grade results concerns the test itself. Only 3.6% of Massachusetts low-income urban 
students earn an Advanced rating in 8
th grade, compared to 13% of 10
th graders. Consequently, 
students scoring near the Advanced/Proficient cut-score in 8
th grade are quite high-performing.  INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
(2)  Are the plans and decisions of students without college-going plans especially sensitive to 
performance labels?  
Our hypothesis that at least some of the response to performance labeling operates 
through students’ perceptions of their own ability led us to consider heterogeneity within the 
urban, low-income group. If students respond to the information embedded in performance 
labels, we expect these responses to be concentrated among students who have weaker prior 
beliefs about their academic abilities. Indeed, we find that performance labels matter much more 
for students who reported before they took the examination that they did not plan to attend a 
four-year college than for those with college-going plans. For students who did not plan to attend 
a four-year college, earning a more positive label has a substantial, positive effect on their 
college enrollment decisions. 
  Importantly, our analysis of the 8
th grade results is limited by data availability. The state 
first administered the 8
th grade survey to students in 2006, so we cannot examine college 
attendance directly. Instead, we must rely on a proxy: students’ expressed educational plans in 
10
th grade.  The results are striking. As seen in Table 4 being classified as Needs Improvement 
instead of Warning/Failing on the 8
th grade mathematics examination raises students’ fitted 
probability of expressing four-year college as their intended post-secondary goal on the 10
th 
grade survey by 4 percentage points (p=0.088). Earning a Proficient label instead of Needs 
Improvement raises the probability of expressing four-year college-going plans by 6.2 percentage 
points, although this does not rise to traditional levels of statistical significance (p=0.238). 
Finally, scoring Advanced instead of Proficient in 8
th grade increases the probability of 
expressing four-year college-going plans by 14 percentage points (p=0.074). These effects are substantial for the group of high-performing 8
th graders who do not plan to attend college. In all 
cases, there are no effects for students who reported before taking the examination that they plan 
to attend a four-year college.  
  These effects are both large and important, given the strong relationship between 
students’ college-going plans and their actual probability of enrolling in college.  In fact, urban, 
low-income students who express plans to attend a four-year college on the 10
th grade survey 
have estimated odds of enrolling in college that are nearly 3.5 times greater than the odds for 
similar students with lower educational expectations. These odds are still 2.4 times greater than 
the odds for students without college-going plans after controlling for students’ test scores and 
other demographic characteristics. Thus, expectations are strong predictors of students’ actual 
educational attainments. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
  We find very similar patterns on the 10
th grade test. Again, performance labeling appears 
to be important particularly for students who did not plan to attend a four-year college. In 
particular, for these students, being classified as Advanced, rather than Proficient, increases the 
fitted probability that they will attend college by 9.9 percentage points (p=0.010). For these 10
th 
graders on the margin, the estimated probability of attending college increases from 
approximately 39% to 49% simply by being labeled Advanced instead of Proficient. 
In Figure 2, we present these results visually. In each figure, we include the sample 
probabilities of attending college (grade 10 outcome) or expressing four-year college-going plans 
(grade 8 outcome) for students with and without college-going plans before they took the 
respective test. We overlay the fitted values from our local linear-regression analysis.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE These figures illustrate several important patterns. First, students who report as 10
th 
graders that they plan to attend a four-year college do indeed attend college at a substantially 
higher rate than students with other plans. Similarly, students who report as 8
th graders that they 
plan to attend a four-year college have a much greater probability of reporting the same plans in 
10
th grade. Second, across all three cut-scores, there is no clear disruption in the smoothed 
relationship for students with four-year college expectations. In other words, the new information 
that students receive when they earn the more positive label does not seem to affect their 
probability of attending college. However, for students without four-year college plans, earning 
the more positive performance label increases substantially the probability of attending college 
or of expressing four-year college-going plans. This effect is seen in the sharp disruptions at the 
cut score. The effect of being classified as Advanced appears to be particularly large, both in 8
th 
and 10
th grades. By contrast, while the effect of scoring Proficient instead of Needs Improvement 
appears to be greater for students without college-plans than those with college-going plans, 
these differences are not statistically significant and the magnitudes are relatively small. Thus, 
labeling near the middle of the distribution appears to have less of an effect on students’ post-
secondary decisions than labeling at the top or bottom. 
(3) Does prior test performance shed light on the relative importance of encouragement and 
discouragement effects? 
  The findings presented above indicate clearly that the information embedded in 
performance labels causes students to update their ideas about their educational futures and to 
alter college-going decisions. Students without plans to attend a four-year college are most liable 
to update their plans and alter their decisions. However, the precise interpretation of these 
findings proves challenging because we do not know whether they reflect the positive effects of earning a better label or the negative effects of earning a worse label. In other words, students 
who are labeled as Advanced could be encouraged by their performance, which could lead them 
to update positively their beliefs about their abilities, thereby increasing the probability they 
subsequently attend college.  However, relatively high-performing students who are labeled as 
simply Proficient may be discouraged by their failure to achieve the more prestigious Advanced 
label and, as a result, may not consider themselves “college material”. This would represent a 
negative updating of their abilities. Unfortunately, since each group provides our estimate of the 
counterfactual for the other, our regression-discontinuity estimates cannot resolve this 
conundrum and only summarize the net effect.  
  In an attempt to shed light on the relative importance of encouragement and 
discouragement effects, we capitalize on information about students’ past test performances. 
Here, we assume that students respond to the information embedded in the test performance label 
when it is different from the label that they had earned in a previous grade. However, we assume 
that no updating occurs if the new information matches students’ prior labels. We present results 
from these analyses for the 8
th grade test in Table 5, where we show the estimated causal effect 
of earning a more positive label for students who earned lower scores on their most recent test 
compared to those with higher scores on their most recent test. Suggestively, we find different 
patterns of responses at different parts of the test-score distribution. For example, being labeled 
Needs Improvement instead of Warning has no effect for students who had scored Warning 
previously – this suggests that there is no encouragement effect for students near the bottom of 
the 8
th grade test-score distribution. However, we find substantial effects for students who had 
received a label of Needs Improvement or better in the past, which we interpret as a 
discouragement effect of earning Warning instead of Needs Improvement. At the middle and the top of the current test-score distribution, the patterns are reversed, suggesting that earning a 
positive label encourages higher performing students. On the 10
th grade test, the performance 
level cutoffs are lower than on the 8
th grade examination. For example, nearly all students near 
the Advanced/Proficient had scored Proficient or lower on the 8
th grade test. Thus, in both 8
th and 
10
th grades the encouragement effect appears to predominate at the top of the distribution.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Threats to Validity 
  As we have noted, the internal validity of a regression-discontinuity design depends on 
two important assumptions. First, the “treatment” – here embodied in the particular performance 
label applied to students scoring immediately at/above or below the cutoff – must have been 
assigned exogenously by the placement of the students with respect to the cutoff on the forcing 
variable and applied rigidly to all students. In other words, students must not be able to 
manipulate their position on the forcing variable relative to the cut score. If this condition holds, 
then all student characteristics, both observed and unobserved, should be a smooth function of 
the forcing variable around the cut score.  
In our research, we argue that this assumption holds because the cut scores differ from 
year-to-year based on a complicated scaling formula and are determined after students take the 
test; thus, it would be hard, if not impossible, for students at the margin of passing to manipulate 
their explicit positions with respect to the cut-off knowingly while taking the examination.  
However, we can also test if this assumption is met in several ways. First, if students can 
influence their position on the forcing variable relative to the cut-off by manipulating their test 
performance, we would expect the test-score distribution to be discontinuous near the cut-off. In all cases, we see no discontinuity apparent at the cut score.
20 Second, if students can influence 
their labeling after taking the test, we would expect to see some non-compliers, or students 
whose test scores fell below the cutoff but earned the more positive label regardless. Again, we 
see no cases of such manipulation in the data. 
Third, we conducted extensive exploratory analyses to check for smoothness in the 
relationship between observed student characteristics and the forcing variable around the cut-off. 
Visual inspection of the underlying distributions suggests that these relationships are smooth 
over the cut-score. Seeking to summarize these analyses in a single test, we followed the 
approach suggested by Lee & Lemieux (2010).  We fit a set of seemingly unrelated regression 
(SURE) models, each of which consists of our basic regression-discontinuity model, but with a 
different covariate treated as the outcome. Then, we tested whether the coefficients on the 
discontinuity term equaled zero, jointly across all covariates. We executed this procedure five 
times, once at each cutoff and grade.  In Table 6, we present the results of these analyses, both 
for our full sample of urban, low-income students and for the sample of students who did not 
plan to attend a four-year college. In all cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and find no 
reason to doubt that the state has imposed the cut score exogenously.   
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
The second key assumption underpinning our regression-discontinuity strategy is that we 
have specified the hypothesized relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable 
(mathematics test score) correctly, at least in the immediate vicinity of the cut score. We have 
addressed this issue by focusing our analyses within an optimal bandwidth of the cut-scores on 
the forcing variables and adopting a flexible local linear-regression approach. The key decision 
in this analysis is the choice of bandwidth, h, which governs the amount of smoothing. 
                                                 
20 Figures available from the authors on request.  Therefore, to assess the sensitivity of our findings to this decision, we refitted our principal 
statistical models while restricting the sample to students whose test scores fell within different 
bandwidths around the cut-off on the forcing variable.  
In Table 7, we present the estimated causal effects for each of our analyses across a range 
of bandwidths. Our main findings remain robust to the choice of bandwidth. While the 
magnitudes of a few individual estimates are sensitive to these choices, the general patterns 
persist across a range of bandwidths. In particular, the effects of earning Advanced instead of 
Proficient for students who do not plan to attend a four-year college are generally large, positive, 
and statistically significant. In Figure 3, we explore this result in more depth for both the 8
th 
grade (top panel) and 10
th grade (bottom panel) tests. Here, we present the estimated causal 
effect from our local linear-regression analysis with bandwidths ranging from 3 to 15 score 
points, along with 90% confidence intervals. We see that, in both cases, the estimated effect of 
earning a more positive label is consistently large across a wide range of bandwidths. Given the 
smaller sample size in 8
th grade, some of these estimates do not reach traditional levels of 
statistical significance, but the general pattern remains.  
INSERT TABLE 7 AND FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
  
Discussion 
We conclude that urban low-income students – or those who teach or advise them – do 
indeed respond to performance labels. In other words, the labels are used – or misused – as a 
“fast and frugal heuristic” that influences decisions even though they provide no additional 
information beyond that in fine-grained scores. Receiving a positive performance label, even on 
low-stakes tests that carry no official consequences for students, increases the probability that urban, low-income students attend college. These labels matter even though students also receive 
the fine-grained test scores on which they are based. The effect of labeling is concentrated at the 
extremes of the test-score distribution. In other words, being labeled as Warning or as Advanced 
seems to matter a great deal to students; by contrast, being labeled as Proficient instead of Needs 
Improvement matters less. Furthermore, as theory predicts, the effect is particularly large for 
students who reported before they took the test that they did not plan to attend a four-year 
college. Students are updating their college-going plans in response to performance information, 
and this updating is concentrated among students with the weakest priors. The large labor-market 
returns to post-secondary education make the results important substantively.   
There are at least two complementary explanations for the powerful effects of labels. 
First, cognitive limitations may make interpretations of complicated test-score data difficult and 
may increase students’ reliance on the performance labels. The state attempts to minimize this 
issue by presenting test-performance data in a variety of ways (see Appendix A), including a 
visual depiction with error bars on the interpretive material. But, students—or their parents—
may not have the skills necessary to understand these distinctions clearly.  
  Second, the labels may evoke emotional responses. There is a growing literature in 
economics that focuses on the role of emotions and other psychological features in the decision-
making process. Receiving performance labels like Advanced or Warning on a test that teachers 
and other adults have identified as important may well affect students, particularly adolescents 
whose cognitive processes are fragile and still in development. If anything, the fact that so 
seemingly weak a signal as the performance label on a state test can have such persistent and 
substantial effects on educational outcomes speaks loudly to the vulnerability of students’ 
conceptions of their own abilities. In other words, urban, low-income students’ priors about their educational abilities appear to be rather weak, even in the 10
th grade. In particular, high-
achieving students seem to respond quite strongly to external acknowledgment of their 
intellectual abilities.  
  Although we find that the label itself matters, we cannot determine precisely the 
mechanisms through which these effects operate. For example, students could respond directly, 
feeling encouraged or discouraged as a result of their performance. However, parents or teachers 
may also respond, producing indirect effects on student outcomes. For example, teachers may 
simply examine a list of students scoring at each performance level, using explicitly only the 
information contained in the labels. Thus, their attitudes and expectations about students may be 
formed by these test labels and may in turn affect their interactions with students. Our results do 
suggest that at least part of the effect operates through student – rather than teacher – responses. 
The reason is that the effects of performance labels on students’ subsequent educational 
decisions are stronger for students without four-year college expectations, even in models with 
school fixed effects.
21  Since teachers are unlikely to know directly about students’ college 
expectations, this pattern is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the observed effects stem 
primarily from teachers’ responses to students’ performance labels. At a minimum, any such 
effects must interact with the attitudes and behaviors of the students themselves.  
  Furthermore, the fact that labeling matters more for students at the top or the bottom of 
the test-score distribution suggests two complementary explanations. First, more extreme labels 
such as Warning or Advanced may simply matter more to students or to their teachers. 
Alternately, schools may be involved in strategic behaviors to get students over the proficiency 
                                                 
21 Results from models with school fixed effects produce quite similar point estimates to those presented here, 
although the estimates are somewhat less precise. Specific results are available from the authors on request. cutoff and to keep them there.  To the extent that schools focus attention on “bubble kids” on 
either side of the Proficient cutoff, we would expect any effects of labeling to be muted.  
Our findings have an important methodological implication for research that aims to 
identify the causal effects of policy interventions using a regression-discontinuity strategy.  
Often researchers take advantage of policies that assign students to treatment based on whether 
their value on a continuous forcing variable such as a test score falls below (or above) a 
particular cut-off.  However, if individuals respond to performance labels on these same tests, 
then estimates of the intervention’s effects will be confounded with the effect of the labeling 
itself. In short, our paper presents evidence that mechanisms, including emotional responses, 
may be at play when students are assigned to groups based on test-score performance. As a 
result, using such test-score classifications as an exogenous source of assignment to treatments 
may produce biased estimates of the relevant treatment effects. In all cases, researchers must 
think carefully about the range of pathways through which assignment to treatment in a quasi-
experimental design may affect student outcomes other than through the treatment itself. 
Finally, this paper has substantive implications for policymakers. The fact that dividing a 
continuous performance distribution into discrete categories affects students’ post-secondary 
educational enrollments is clearly an important, unintended consequence of state testing policies 
as they have been implemented. Given that the state has invested in providing parents and 
students with detailed and clear reports concerning student performance, this result is particularly 
interesting. It appears that, on average, urban low-income students (or their parents or teachers) 
use the information contained in the performance label itself, even though finer-grained 
information about test performance is available. The performance label– ostensibly a fairly weak 
signal – has a powerful effect on student outcomes, including college enrollment decisions that occur several years after the test. This is particularly true for the encouragement of earning an 
Advanced label for relatively high-performing students. Furthermore, the labels we examine 
provide information about student performance relatively late in their academic careers. That 
students respond to these labels suggests that their priors are still relatively weak and that high 
school is not too late for potentially effective educational interventions.  
These effects are particularly large for students who do not plan to attend a four-year 
college after high school. This group appears to be vulnerable to the effects of labeling, 
suggesting that these students are sensitive either to positive encouragement or negative 
reinforcement of their attitudes. That the responses to labeling appear to be positive 
encouragement effects at the top of the distribution suggests that the need to address this 
consequence is not as urgent for high-performing students. However, at the bottom of the 
distribution, earning a worse label appears to discourage students, suggesting that policymakers 
and school officials should consider finding ways to support those students who earn the 
“Warning” label. In order to formulate clear policy responses to the evidence that performance 
labels matter, though, it is important to learn whose behaviors are responding to the labels and 
the specific mechanisms through which the labels affect subsequent educational outcomes. We 
plan to explore these questions in subsequent papers.  References 
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 Table 1. Description of data structure and cohorts, by the availability of specific outcomes. 
 
Test Cohort  College-going 
plans  College attendance 
8th Grade:     
2002-03 2004-05  2007-08 
2003-04 2005-06  2008-09 
2004-05 2006-07  -- 
2005-06 2007-08  -- 
2006-07 2008-09  -- 
10th Grade: 
2002-03 --  2005-06 
2003-04 --  2006-07 
2004-05 --  2007-08 
2005-06 --  2008-09 
 Table 2. Number of urban, low-income students in the sample, number reporting post-secondary 
plans on surveys given before the test, and the percentage of urban, low-income students who 
reported plans to attend a four-year college, by performance level on the mathematics MCAS test 
in 8
th grade (2002-03 to 2007-08) and 10
th grade (2002-03 to 2006-07) 
 
Performance label 
Number of urban, 
low-income 
students 
Number of urban, 
low-income 
students 
responding to the 
survey 
Percent of urban, 
low-income 
students planning 
to attend a four-
year college 
8
th Grade:     
     Advanced  2,015 876  84.70 
     Proficient  8,068 3,358  74.42 
     Needs Improvement  19,744 7,328  62.83 
     Warning  39,402 11,895 46.73 
10
th Grade:      
     Advanced  4,699 4,014  84.93 
     Proficient  7,073 5,721  70.98 
     Needs Improvement  11,854 9,337  60.03 
     Failing  12,573 8,486  45.60 
 Table 3. Estimated effect of earning the more positive performance label at different cutoffs and 
on different outcomes, for urban, low-income students scoring near the cut point. Cell entries 
include the parameter estimate, standard error (in parentheses), optimal bandwidth used, sample 
size, and approximate p-value.  
 







th Grade       
College attendance  0.021
~ 0.001 0.007 
 (0.009)  (0.028)  (0.035) 
 h=3  h=8  h=4 
 5,801  6,313  1,248 
      
Panel II: 10
th Grade 
College attendance  N/A  0.008  0.051* 
   (0.010)  (0.020) 
   h=6  h=8 
   8,280  4,171 
      
NOTE: 
~, p<0.10; *, p<0.05; **, p<0.01; ***, p<0.001. Estimated effects from a local linear regression-
discontinuity model from equation (1) using observations within one bandwidth on either side of the cutoff, with the 
following control predictors: student race, gender, whether the student was new to the state, was currently or 





 Table 4. Estimated effect of earning the more positive performance label at different cutoffs and 
on different outcomes, for urban, low-income students scoring near the cut point, by whether 
they express plans to attend a four-year college after high school. Cell entries include parameter 
estimates, standard errors (in parentheses), and approximate p-value.  
 








Needs Improvement/Warning Cutoff: 
   Express 4-year college plans (grade 10)  0.009  0.040 
~  3,824 
 (0.031)  (0.021)    h=5 
        
Proficient/Needs Improvement Cutoff:           
   Express 4-year college plans (grade 10)  -0.028  0.062 
  4,487 
 (0.012)  (0.051)    h=8 
        
Advanced/Proficient Cutoff:        
   Express 4-year college plans (grade 10)  0.007  0.137 
~  2,294 
 (0.023)  (0.071)    h=8 
Panel II: 10
th Grade 
Proficient/Needs Improvement Cutoff:         
   College Attendance  -0.002  0.013   6,609 
 (0.014)  (0.032)    h=6 
        
Advanced/Proficient Cutoff:        
   College Attendance  0.027  0.099 **  3,316 
 (0.035)  (0.033)    h=8 
NOTE: 
~, p<0.10; *, p<0.05; **, p<0.01; ***, p<0.001. Estimated effects from a local linear regression-
discontinuity model from equation (2) using observations within one bandwidth on either side of the cutoff, with the 
following control predictors: student race, gender, whether the student was new to the state, was currently or 
formerly classified as limited English proficient, or required special education, and the fixed effect of cohort. 
 
 Table 5. Estimated effect of earning the more positive performance label at different cutoffs and 
on different outcomes, for urban, low-income students scoring near the cut point, by whether 
they scored above or below the cutoff on an earlier test. Cell entries include parameter estimates, 












Needs Improvement/Warning Cutoff: 
   Attend college  -0.006  0.108 ***  h=3 
 (0.032)  (0.022)     
 1,531  1,077     
          
Proficient/Needs Improvement Cutoff: 
   Attend college  0.061 -0.013   h=8 
 (0.035)  (0.042)     
 1,840  1,150     
          
Advanced/Proficient Cutoff:           
   Attend college  0.086***  0.091   h=4 
 (0.013)  (0.050)     
 451  182     
NOTE: 
~, p<0.10; *, p<0.05; **,  p<0.01; ***, p<0.001. Estimated effects from a local linear regression-
discontinuity model from equation (2) using observations within one bandwidth on either side of the cutoff, with the 
following control predictors: student race, gender, whether the student was new to the state, was currently or 
formerly classified as limited English proficient, or required special education, and the fixed effect of cohort. 
 
 Table 6. Results from the hypothesis test that the disruption in each observed covariate is zero in 
the population at each of the three cut-scores, from a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
regression-discontinuity model where each covariate is treated as an outcome, for the full sample 
of urban, low-income students and the subsample of students who plan to attend a four-year 
college.  
 






Panel I: Grade 8    
Needs Improvement/Warning Cutoff  χ
2(11) = 11.15  χ
2(11) = 6.63 
  p=0.431 p =0.829 
    
Proficient/Needs Improvement Cutoff  χ
2(11) = 10.28  χ
2(11) = 9.02 
  p=0.505  p=0.620 
    
Advanced/Proficient Cutoff  χ
2(11) = 6.55  χ
2(11) = 10.60 
  p=0.835 p =0.477 
Panel II: Grade 10    
Proficient/Needs Improvement Cutoff  χ
2(11) = 7.59  χ
2(11) = 6.90 
  p=0.749  p=0.807 
    
Advanced/Proficient Cutoff  χ
2(11) = 15.66  χ
2(11) = 9.96 
  p=0.154 p =0.534 
NOTE: Covariates treated as outcomes include student race, gender, and whether the student was new to the state, 





Table 7. Estimated effect of earning the more positive performance label at different cutoffs and on different outcomes, by bandwidth.  
Outcome  Bandwidth 
h*-2 h*-1 h* h*+1  h*+2 
8th Grade Needs Improvement/Warning cutoff - All Urban, Low-Income Students: 
     College Attendance (h*=3)  -- --   0.021 ~  0.023 ~  0.028 ~ 
         (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.014)  
8th Grade Needs Improvement/Warning cutoff - Urban, Low-Income Students without Four-Year College Plans: 
     Express College Plans (Grade 10) (h*=5)  -0.007   0.028   0.04 ~  0.023   0.027  
  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.021)  
8th Grade Proficient/Needs Improvement cutoff - All Urban, Low-Income Students: 
     College Attendance (h*=7)  -0.013   -0.001   0.004   0.001   0.003  
  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.027)  
8th Grade Proficient/Needs Improvement cutoff - Urban, Low-Income Students without Four-Year College Plans: 
     Express College Plans (Grade 10) (h*=8)  0.109 ~  0.074   0.062   0.086 ~  0.085 * 
  (0.051)  (0.058)  (0.051)  (0.045)  (0.039)  
8th Grade Advanced/Proficient cutoff – All Urban, Low-Income Students: 
     College Attendance (h*=9)  --    -0.047   0.007   0   0.012  
     (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.026)  (0.027)  
8th Grade Advanced/Proficient cutoff - Urban, Low-Income Students without Four-Year College Plans: 
     Express College Plans (Grade 10) (h*=8)  0.148 ~  0.151 ~  0.137 ~  0.153 *  0.123  
  (0.076)  (0.072)  (0.071)  (0.069)  (0.073)  
10th Grade Proficient/Needs Improvement cutoff – All Urban, Low-Income Students: 
     College Attendance (h*=6)  0.031 ~  0.02 ~  0.008   -0.003   -0.003  
  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011)  
10th Grade Proficient/Needs Improvement cutoff - Urban, Low-Income Students without Four-Year College Plans: 
     College Attendance (h*=6)  0.048   0.024   0.013   0.002   0.016  
  (0.043)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.030)  
10th Grade Advanced/Proficient cutoff – All Urban, Low-Income Students: 
     College Attendance (h*=8)  0.016   0.043 ~  0.051 *  0.038 ~  0.030  
  (0.021)    (0.022)    (0.020)    (0.019)    (0.018)   
10th Grade Advanced/Proficient cutoff - Urban, Low-Income Students without Four-Year College Plans: 
     College Attendance (h*=8)  0.057   0.097 *  0.099 **  0.061   0.074 * 
  (0.040)    (0.037)    (0.033)    (0.036)    (0.030)   
NOTE: *, p<0.05; **, p<0.01; ***, p<0.001. Estimated effects from a local linear regression-discontinuity model from equation (1) using observations within 
one bandwidth on either side of the cutoff, with the following control predictors: student race, gender, whether the student was new to the state, was currently or 
formerly classified as limited English proficient, or required special education, and the fixed effect of cohort. 43 
Figure 1. Sample probabilities of expressing an interest in attending a four-year college, 



























































Figure 2. Fitted local linear-regression relationships between the probability of attending college and 10
th grade mathematics score 
relative to the Advanced/Proficient cutoff (panel 1, h*=8), the probability of attending college and 10
th grade mathematics score 
relative to the Proficient/Needs Improvement cutoff (panel 2, h*=8),the probability of expressing four-year college-going plans in 
grade 10 and 8
th grade mathematics score relative to the Advanced/Proficient cutoff (panel 3, h*=8), the probability of expressing 
four-year college-going plans in grade 10 and 8
th grade mathematics score relative to the Proficient/Needs Improvement cutoff (panel 
4, h*=8), and the probability of expressing four-year college-going plans in grade 10 and 8
th grade mathematics score relative to the 
Needs Improvement/Warning cutoff (panel 5, h*=5), with the sample mean probabilities overlaid, for urban, low-income students who 
do and do not express plans to attend a four-year college before they take the test.  
 
Panel 1: 10
th Grade Advanced/Proficient Cutoff    Panel 2. 10
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th Grade Advanced/Proficient Cutoff    Panel  4.  8
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Figure 3. Estimated causal effect of earning Advanced instead of Proficient on the 8
th grade (top 
panel) and 10
th grade (bottom panel) tests, from local linear regression-discontinuity analysis 
































































tAppendix A. Sample report provided to students with their MCAS test results. 
 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 